Social Network Links
Powered by Squarespace
Search the Riddleblog
"Amillennialism 101" -- Audio and On-Line Resources

托马斯•里德,为什么他的“常识吗” Philosophy Still Matter?


Reid's Official Portrait托马斯·里德(1710年4月10日至1796年10月7日)是“常识”的创始人和主要哲学家,更确切地说,是“苏格兰常识现实主义”(SCSR)。里德在18世纪的苏格兰启蒙运动时期受到高度尊重,也颇具影响力,但里德的受欢迎程度和他的常识哲学在后来的几代人中迅速消退。虽然注定相对默默无闻,里德的影响力确实在几个季度保持强劲。最近,雷德式的复兴在几卷关于雷德哲学的书中有所体现,他的著作出版了新的评论版(由爱丁堡大学出版),并受到了所谓“改革认识论者”阿尔文·普兰廷加和尼古拉斯·沃尔特斯托夫的优待。

这篇文章的目的是介绍托马斯·里德的“常识”哲学,我相信,这个哲学长期以来一直被误解,因此被忽视,在为基督教建立一个“常识”的道歉中,它仍然扮演着重要的角色——一个以耶稣基督的身体复活为中心的道歉,作为基督教的主要真理主张。


The Life and Times of Thomas Reid

Reid was born and raised in Strachan, near Aberdeen, Scotland. The son of a Church of Scotland minister (the Rev. Lewis Reid, 1676-1762), Reid’s mother was Margaret Gregory, one of twenty-nine children, and from the famed Gregory clan. Her first cousin, James Gregory (1638–1675), was a respected mathematician and astronomer who invented the reflecting telescope. Reid began attending Marischal College in Aberdeen in 1723, and graduated Master in 1726. Reid was only 16, but this was typical for the time. Reid was greatly influenced by his teacher, George Turnbull. Turnbull was a follower of idealist philosopher Bishop George Berkeley–Reid later came to oppose the Bishop with great vigor, as he did the empiricist philosophers John Locke and David Hume. During his time at Marischal, Reid became thoroughly acquainted with Isaac Newton’s公关incipia Mathmatica,并在牛顿的整个职业生涯中对他表示了极大的赞赏。

在成为哲学家之前,里德曾担任教区牧师。1731年,他获得了苏格兰教会的传教许可,并在获得许可后短暂地从事神学研究。1737年,里德被任命为牧师,在新马查尔(靠近阿伯丁)的一个小教堂接受牧师的召唤。在新马查尔(1740)时,里德娶了他的妻子伊丽莎白。他们一共有九个孩子,其中八个孩子不幸地活了下来。人们对里德在新马查尔的事奉知之甚少,但流传着这样一个故事:里德在教区的受欢迎程度不如他的妻子。这是因为有传闻说里德是通过赞助获得的——这在像新马查尔这样的小乡村教区是一种不受欢迎的做法。

It is likely that Reid belonged to the “moderate party” of Hugh Blair (a popular Scottish minister). The so-called “Moderates” focused on Christian morality, not the Calvinistic doctrines found in the Westminster Standards, to which all ministers of the Church of Scotland were required give to affirmation. Reid’s sermons are lost to us, but his deep personal faith and piety is expressed in a prayer in which he praised God for his providential mercy after Elizabeth had been spared during a serious illness.

While in New Machar, Reid continued to read and study philosophy, specifically the work of Glasgow moral philosopher Francis Hutcheson and his influential book,Inquiry into the Origins of the Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.Reid also read and digested fellow Scot David Hume’s对人性的论述(1738-40). 里德的第一篇文章论数量,发表于1748年10月的皇家学会。这是一个很好的迹象,即哲学兴趣 - 不是神学事务 - 即使在教区服务时也能够驾驶Reid的智力生活。

In 1751, Reid took a professorship at King’s College Aberdeen, becoming a teacher, lecturer and regent. In accepting this call, Reid was required to give up his ordination and did so in 1752. Along with John Gregory and other notable intellectuals, Reid founded the Aberdeen Philosophical Society (popularly known as the “Wise Club”), which continued meeting until 1773. During this time, Reid completed his doctoral work, but did not publish his first book until 1764,An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense当Reid达到54岁时。就伊曼纽尔康德的情况而言,据称在阅读大卫休谟的德语翻译后,声称被唤醒了他的“教条床头”论文, Reid too was stirred by Hume–in Reid’s case by Hume’sAn Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,于1748年首次出版。休谟出版的作品在英国国内引起了持续的讨论聪明俱乐部, and Reid’sInquiryis thought to be largely based upon lectures developed for聪明俱乐部discussions.

大卫休谟Reid’sInquiry主要是对休谟的回应,但Reid也瞄准了所谓的“理想理论”的其他倡导者。根据Reid的说法,除了休谟之外,那些持有“理想理论”的人包括Rene Cofartes,John Locke和George Berkeley。理想的理论家放置了心灵和我们在外部世界的感觉之间的想法和我们的知识。理想的理论主义者必须持怀疑态度,即使是对外部世界的直接知识的可能性 - 尽管他们从未表达过他们的怀疑论,因为他们的理论逻辑决定了。瑞士迅速成为休谟最强大的评论家的雷德,试图挑战被休谟赋予幽默生活的“怀疑论”的“怪物”。如果有的话,那么Reid的哲学工作,他对他的所有形式的认识论怀疑主义的凶狠反对是他的Inquiry.Reid’s challenge to the ideal theorist still stands. Can your philosophy actually assure us of the existence of the external world? Or does the author (however unintentionally) ultimately drive us to skepticism by placing a representational or mental “theory of ideas” between the world which exists and our perception of it.

Shortly before Reid’sInquirywas published, he was offered the prestigious Professorship of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, where he became the immediate successor to Adam Smith (1723-1790), the author of the influentialWealth of Nations(1776)。Reid接受了这个电话,留在格拉斯哥,直到他在1781年退休。在他的退休期内,Reid将他的大学讲座转变为书籍,关于人的知识权力的论文(1785) andEssays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind(1788)。

在智力和活跃(和代理人)权力的这些卷中,Reid捍卫了人类自由的自由主义概念 - 即,人类机构负责男女的自由行动,他们对他们的选择是道德责任的。但Reid认为他的观点与规定的威斯敏斯特标准完全兼容agency,但不是causality人类行为的神秘的“公关edestination and foreknowledge of God in conjunction with the liberty of man” (Reid, "Prescience and Liberty," inWorks of, II.977).

Reid also directly attacked Hume’s notion of personal identity, in which Hume famously held that human identity is nothing but the on-going memory of our experiences over time. Hume once wondered whether he still existed while he slept, and if his existence was reconstituted each morning upon awakening. Reid appreciated Hume’s wit, but held that any sequence of memories we may have is grossly insufficient to ground personal identity and self-awareness, which are common sense beliefs held by all–even by those like Hume, though the latter candidly admitted to doubting them.

One of Reid’s most effective methods of criticism of his opponents was to argue that philosophers like Hume often raised provocative questions in the safety of their private studies, boldly going against widely accepted “common sense” human convictions of the day (i.e., causality and on-going personal identity). As Reid pointed out, such men cannot live out their philosophical convictions in the real world they actually inhabit. Reid playfully jabbed Hume, stating that if he (Reid) chooses not to believe my senses, “I break my nose against a post that comes in my way, I step into a dirty kennel; and after twenty such wise and rational actions I am taken up and clapped into a madhouse” (Reid,Inquiry,在Works of, 1:184). Hume may question whether there is a third thing (causality) between the billiard ball and cue which strikes it, but presumably such skepticism never stopped Hume from playing billiards. Hume’s theory does not stop us (nor Hume) from trusting our senses.

众所周知,里德是一个谦虚谦逊的人,受人喜爱,广受尊敬。他的讣告(在报纸上)Glasgow Courier) describes his as “a life distinguished by an ardent love of truth, an assiduous pursuit of it in various sciences, by the most amiable simplicity in manners, gentleness of temper, strength of affection, candour, and liberality of expression.”


里德谈“首要原则”

The great conundrum faced by philosophers since time immemorial is the question “how do we know what we know?” This question falls under the sub-category of philosophy known as epistemology. Those who contend that all human knowledge arises through our senses are called “empiricists.” Those who believe that our knowledge is grounded in our ideas (i.e. our mental powers and state of mind) are often identified as “idealists.”

进入更好的Reid,德国哲学家Immanuel Kant(1722-1804),其体积纯粹理性批判,于1781年首次出版。康德哲学之所以如此重要和具有开创性,是因为康德提出了一个令人信服的理由,即尽管所有知识都是从感官开始的,即通过我们的感官接收到的数据,但认知过程并没有就此结束。如果大脑没有天生的能力来处理这些感觉,从而将它们转化为知识,那么这个世界对我们来说仍然是不可理解的,尽管数据来自我们的感官。康德认为,有一些特定的心理范畴,它们与经验毫无关系,它们与我们有着千丝万缕的联系,塑造着我们所接受的那些感觉。

These so-calleda prioricategories (i.e., they are in place before we experience the world) include notions of time and space, logic, and mathematics. A creature without such categories would have the same sensations and see the same appearances we do, but would have an entirely different experience of them. My dog and I see the same tree. Since he does not have the mental categories I have, we experience the same tree quite differently. According to Kant, we see not “the thing in itself,” but only the thing as interpreted by our minds according to thea prioricategories. This is reflected in Kant’s well-known distinction between the noumenal (the world beyond experience but which can reasonably be inferred from experience) and the phenomenal (the world which is actually experienced and accessed through the senses).

里德,已经说过,从休谟的怀疑主义落后,如果我们要知道这个世界,那就追求了“必要的必要条件”吗?Reid Honders“人类思想必须拥有什么能力,以真正了解外部世界?”他将这些能力分类为他认为的“第一原则”,他认为是人类所谓的“常识”。简单地假设这些原则,不能证明。我们在没有对他们的任何反映的情况下使用它们,我们也不能“证明”它们,因为这样做,我们必须利用我们想要证明的非常能力。虽然人们普遍的原因是从这些第一个原则上,即使他们不相信上帝,我们也不会追求“常识”来发现为什么事情是他们的方式,里德争论没有办法解释这些第一个原则的存在和与创造世界的上帝之外的人类常见意识,并设计我们在这个世界内生活和行动。里德写道,

I thank the Author of my being, who bestowed it upon me before the eyes of my reason were opened, and still bestows it upon me, to be my guide where reason leaves me in the dark. And now I yield to the direction of my senses, not from instinct only, but from confidence and trust in a faithful and beneficent Monitor, grounded upon the experience of his paternal care and goodness. In all this, I deal with the Author of my being, no otherwise than I thought it reasonable to deal with my parents and tutors. I believed by instinct whatever they told me, long before I had the idea of a lie, or thought of the possibility of their deceiving me (Reid,Inquiry,在Works of,I.184)。

里德第一原则的有神论含义不容忽视。我们通过常识进行推理,因为造物主设计了我们这样做。

Immanuel Kant既然康德也是通过与休谟的互动而被唤醒的,那么里德和康德追求同一个目标也就不足为奇了。里德想挑战休谟的怀疑论,康德也是如此——尽管康德的方法与里德的方法大不相同。里德呼吁所有年龄、所有文化的所有人所假设的东西——确定那些在现实世界中奠定人类知识基础的首要原则——而不仅仅是在经验或精神范畴中。这使里德成为一个“常识现实主义者”——我们确实通过日常活动理解了世界的本来面目。里德确实不应该被归类为纯粹的经验主义者,尽管他确实属于经验主义阵营。另一方面,康德认为最好的方法是通过识别人类理性的极限来定义人类理性的极限a priorimental categories which transform mere appearances of things into our knowledge of them. Kant’s so-called “transcendental idealism” sets out the premise that knowledge begins when we receive appearances of external things via sense perception, but we cannot regard these appearances as objects of knowledge until our minds organize these appearances through a set of fixeda prioricategories already present in the mind.

里德和康德所争论的关键问题是,我们都必须从某个地方开始认识过程。但是where是吗?我们必须假设某些事情是真实的,并且在我们自我意识的最初几年和体验世界之前,就已经存在于我们的头脑中,否则我们的感觉就只会停留在那一点上——仅仅是感觉,永远不会进入知识。

Reid identified two types of first principles–necessary (certain) and contingent (probable) which provide thea prioriframework to necessary understand the external world (Reid,Intellectual Powers,在Works of, 1:435). Those first principles Reid identified as “necessary” (i.e., it is impossible to deny them) include logic (i.e., the law of non-contradiction) certain rules of grammar, mathematics, morals (unjust actions cause harm) and metaphysical realities–what we perceive actually exists. Reid is certain that God would never allow an evil demon to deceive us as Descartes once wondered. Reid also believed that whatever exists has a cause–in direct opposition to Hume’s skepticism about accepting things as “true” which he could not actually observe.

Those first principles which Reid identified as “contingent” include things such as consciousness of our own person (self-awareness), knowledge of the external world, that what I remember really did happen, that my personal identity truly exists as far back as I can remember, and that those things which I see and perceive really do exist. Reid also argued that we have power as human agents to determine our own actions (we learn about causality, through our own agentic powers, as when infants, we strike the mobile above our heads which causes it to move), that we are able to tell truth from error, we know that other minds exist, and that human testimony is ordinarily true unless we have good reasons to believe otherwise. Reid added that the future course of the world will be similar to what it has been in the past.

里德很清楚他对这些首要原则的重视。

所有的推理都必须从第一原则出发,对于第一原则,除了这一点之外,不能给出其他任何理由,即根据我们本性的构成,我们必须同意它们。这些原则是我们宪法的一部分,不亚于思考的力量:理性既不能创造也不能摧毁它们;没有它们,它也不能做任何事情。一个数学家不能证明他的公理的真理,也不能证明任何东西,除非他认为这些公理是理所当然的。我们不能证明我们的思想的存在,甚至不能证明我们的思想和感觉的存在。历史学家或证人,除非想当然地认为记忆和感官是可信的,否则什么也证明不了(里德,Inquiry,在Works of,1:130)。

为了否认这些原则,Reid认为,是荒谬的。

无论我们是否能证明这一点,我们都必须假设某些能力已经到位,从而开始认识的过程。里德从首要原则开始,既有必要的,也有偶然的。另一方面,康德拒绝里德的现实主义,相反,他认为我们不能看到事物的本来面目,只有通过他著名的“范畴”来调节我们对事物的感知

“常识”雷德

对里德来说,首要原则和常识是密切相关的。在关于人的知识权力的论文,Reid写道,“第一个原则,常识原则,常识,[或]不言而喻的真理”是“不仅仅是他们被认为的。判决必然担心他们,这两者都同样是自然的工作,以及我们原来的力量的结果“(里德,Intellectual Powers,在Works of1:452)。公关eviously, Reid identified common sense as “necessary to all men for their being and preservation, and therefore it is unconditionally given to all men by the Author of Nature” (Reid,Intellectual Powers,在Works of, 1:412).

更具体地说,常识指的是“各时代、各民族、有学问的人和无学问的人的同意,[这些人]在第一原则方面应该有很大的权威,每个人都是称职的法官”(里德,Intellectual Powers,在Works of, 1:464). 这些原则被认为是常识,因为它们是人类共有的,是所有人在不同的时间和文化中持有的。里德把他对常识的信念建立在一个经验主义的合理概括上,即这是人类了解任何事物的必要状态,特别是外部世界的存在。简单地说,这是“常识”,因为它显然是全人类共同的。如果所有人都看到一个物体,然后普遍地赋予该物体相同的性质,在这样做之前不需要任何事先的解释或自我反省,这只能是因为他们对该物体的知识是“真实的”。所有人都本能地这样想,除非被理想理论的老师说服怀疑这种知识。

里德认为常识几乎是不言而喻的,因为普遍的(在这方面,里德是一个基础主义者),他的批评者当时和现在,攻击他在这一点上声称他的常识哲学只不过是一个呼吁多数意见-的“智慧庸俗”。如果是真的,这就破坏了里德第一原理的普遍性。如果常识真的只不过是通过数鼻子和观察未受教育的乌合之众如何做决定来证实的大众观点,那么这些首要原则在解决真理主张方面毫无价值。任何名副其实的哲学家都不敢提出这样的呼吁。


But Reid anticipated this line of criticism and as a good Newtonian, made clear that his first principles were actually empirical and psychological observations, reflecting the way people actually think and interact with the world around them. To give this point some teeth, at several places, Reid appeals to universal elements in the structure of human language (anticipating the later work of G. E. Moore and J. L. Austin). Reid points out that all human language is built upon a distinction between the active and passive voice, and that all languages distinguish between the qualities of things, and the things themselves. This goes a long way toward making Reid’s point.

为了另一种方式,Reid的第一个原则不是真的,因为大多数人接受它们。他们也不是真实的,因为这就是当被问及他们知道如何知道他们所知道的时,普通人或女人是如何表达自己的。相反,人们认为和互动,正如他们所做的那样,正是因为这就是他们的创造者使他们思考和行动的方式。Reid,到我的知识并没有提到“神圣形象”,同时讨论这些常识功能 - 尽管他在讨论道德自由和良心时确实谈论人类的神圣形象(Reid,人的能动力量,在Works of, II.564, 585, 615). But are not the abilities given us by our creator something akin to humans reflecting the image of their creator? We are born with the capacity to utilize these first principles without any self-reflection, or without being able to give any reasons for doing so. This is how God made us, and is his way of enabling and equipping his creatures to live in the world which he has made.

里德谈“感知”


Kant argued that what we perceive with our senses is not “the thing in itself,” since sense data must be mediated through oura prioricategories. We all may see the same object which exists independently of our minds. Yet, our experience of that object is mediated through oura priori类别,决定我们感觉的结果。如果我不能确定我和其他人所看到的是同一件事,即使我们看的是同一个物体,这是否会导致某种形式的怀疑论,尽管康德反对相反的观点?

我们对感知的理解尤其重要,在思考当代辩论的当代辩论的“证据主义者”之间的辩护方法(对基督教的“事实”为目标和“真实”)和“Presup定向者”(谁相信这一点)我们的a priori在这种情况下,对《圣经》中上帝的信仰,对认识过程都是决定性的,因此,仅仅用事实来论证基督教的真理,就有点像傻瓜的差事。预设主义者认为,捍卫信仰的最好方法是假定基督教的真理,并以不一致、事实错误和个人偏见为由挑战不信者。

The founder of the modern school of presuppositionalism, Cornelius Van Til (1895-1987) of Westminster Theological Seminary was “categorical” (pun intended) in his rejection of Kant’s absolute idealism and the latter’s distinction between noumenal and phenomenal realms (Van Til,A Survey of Christian Epistemology,103-115)。但是Van Til受早期一代德国德克(1837-1920)和Herman Bavinck(1854-1921)的两名荷兰改革的神学家受到了极大的影响,他们都使用了康德的a prioricategories to explain how it is that we as fallen humans prejudicially (and sinfully) interpret the world around us–especially in light of the biblical data regarding the damage done to the human intellect and will by Adam’s fall into sin.

The traditional Reformed understanding of the effects of human sinfulness (including the so-called noetic effects of sin), when set forth througha priori像康德这样的范畴,为亚伯拉罕·库珀(Abraham Kuyper)提供了理由,认为堕落完全影响了认知过程,以至于基督徒和非基督徒(通过不同的认知方式)都会受到影响a priori类别-一个再生和一个不再生)可以恰当地描述为从事两种科学(注:你可以在这里插入任何其他人类学科)。有一种再生的方式追求科学,根植于再生a prioricategories, and there is an unregenerate way of doing science, grounded in sinfula prioricategories. In this scheme, the gap between the way a Christian thinks and a non-Christian thinks amounts to a chasm. Van Til agreed and went so far as to state, “to the extent that the two systems of interpretation are self consistently expressed it will be an all-out global war between them” (Van Til, “Introduction” in Warfield,圣经的启示与权威, 24).

This is also reflected in Van Til’s oft-repeated comments to the effect that it is useless to appeal to common ground or “common notions” upon which Christians (regenerate) and non-Christians (unregenerate) can both agree. God tells us (through Scripture) what things truly are and what they actually mean. In sense, this is where the discussion begins and ends for a regenerate person with regeneratea prioricategories–they think God’s thoughts after him, while non-Christians cannot. This is why, according to Van Tilians, Christians should never appeal to non-Christians on the basis of facts supposedly held in common, when there cannot be any such thing. Instead, Christians apologetics ought to challenge non-Christian presuppositions while making the case that the world cannot make sense apart from Christian presuppositions and regeneratea priories.Christians and non-Christians will see the facts around them very differently (i.e., those things which occur in ordinary history in the external world in which we live) As Van Til puts it, “the only `proof’ of the Christian position is that unless its truth is presupposed there is no possibility of proving anything at all. The actual state of affairs as preached by Christianity is the necessary foundation of `proof’ itself” (Van Til,My Credo,21)。

如果是的,这将是康德的辩护,对Reid对第一个原则和常识的概念带来了严峻的挑战,这使得诉诸于不再进行再生和a priori类别,但第一原则和常识,这是普遍持有的共同信教和不信教,即使在亚当的下降。在这里,我们看到两种方法之间的根本分歧基督教道歉改革圈,证据主义和预设。有充分的理由,为什么像B.B.沃菲尔德这样的人对库珀关于两种科学(一种再生,一种不再生)的例子感到完全困惑,以及库珀和巴文克对基督教证据的贬低,例如耶稣的复活,这些证据呼吁可知可证的历史事件(沃菲尔德,“回顾”巴文克的扎赫赫赫德·德斯格罗夫斯, 117). 沃菲尔德追随里德,而库珀、巴文克和范泰尔追随康德。

For Van Til, there can be no such thing as a “brute fact,” or “uninterpreted" fact. Van Til expressed great reservation about Reid’s view of perception in relation to facts. “In the case of Scottish Realism there is, to say the least, an undue emphasis given to the attempt to establish a realism or independence of the object over against the subject” (Van Til,A Survey of Christian Epistemology, 132). In making this comment, Van Til openly sided with Kant over Reid.

But Van Til seems to be of two minds when it comes to Kant’s handling of "facts." While rejecting Kant’s system, Van Til clearly embraced Kant’s understanding of how we experience and know the external world–the subjectivea prioricategories are all-determinative. Van Til claims Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” provides “a fully consistent presentation of one system of interpretation over against the other. For the first time in history the stage is set for a head-on collision” (Van Til, “Introduction” Warfield,圣经的启示与权威, 24). If Kant is right about the necessity ofa prioricategories determining the meaning of sensations coming from the external world, then facts and their interpretation are indeed one thing. With this notion, Van Til is in full agreement. What a Christian sees as evidence for Jesus’ resurrection, a non-Christian may see as evidence of a mythological tale invented by Jesus’ followers.

Perhaps talk show host-psychologist Dr. Phil provides a helpful illustration when he quips “perception is reality.” Dr. Phil says this of someone who is obviously misinterpreting and distorting reality. Exposing such is presumably the reason why such a person is a guest on his program in the first place. Dr. Phil has every hope, it seems, of convincing the troubled person that their misguided perception isreality. If such perceptions are indeed ultimate, there would be no possibility of any further useful discussion. The only remaining option to provide any relief would be the prescribing of medication.

The very possibility of exposing ill-conceived perceptions is one hint that Van Til’s notion of facts and their interpretation being one is not so air-tight after all. What if Reid is right about how we perceive the world and that we must assume certain things to be true to even talk about the matter of how and why common sense works? Reality grounds perception–or ought to. For Reid, what is presupposed is not the entire content of the Christian faith, nor even the authority of Scripture–as it is for Van Til. What is presupposed by Reid is that all people think in a common way, and are able to do so because God made them with the ability to do so. Reid’s focus is on epistemological method grounded in human nature, nota prioricategories or prior mental content.

So what does this have to do facts and their interpretation? To my knowledge, Reid never addressed this matter as we are doing here. Reid is not doing Christian apologetics, rather, he’s refuting Hume and writing before Kant. But I do think Reid would be very comfortable affirming that within the context of human life, certain things are “self-evident.” But facts are “self-evident” because they occur in a context–not as “brute facts.”

打个比方也许有助于进一步充实这一点。把解释事实看作是看戏。假设你在剧中走到一半,比如在第七幕第二场。你看到一个角色说话,然后对另一个角色做出侮辱性的手势。然后你就立刻退出了这出戏。即使你听到了所说的话并目睹了这个手势,你也不知道这些话或手势是什么意思,也不知道为什么它们对故事很重要。这里没有“残酷的事实”。

But things are quite different if you watch the entire play. To get some context, before attending the play you might read several reviews, and you may even have done some research on the playwright. You also know in advance that some play-goers will interpret the characters or the story line differently than the playwright intended. But the play–specifically act 7, scene 2–would make much more sense to you, once you who know who the character is, and why his insult figures so prominently in the plot line of the larger story. You understand that you cannot infallibly interpret the play by reading the playwright’s notes, nor can you possibly understand why every character was present during particular scenes, or why they were given the particular lines they were. Yet, you would not need to do so, nor would you ever expect to do so, to enjoy the play which unfolds scene by scene, one scene building upon another. When you watch the play in its entirely, you can figure out what was going on, because you now have the context to understand what you saw in act 7, scene 2. So it is with facts–they always occur in a context.

This context is what Reid’s notion of common sense provides us. Facts never occur in isolation from other facts. There is always a context for our experience of the external world. In the case of Christ’s resurrection–the critical fact for any discussion of Christian apologetics–the context (i.e., the story line of the play) is the Old Testament’s prediction of the resurrection of the body at the end of the age, the Psalmist’s prophecy that the coming Messiah would not see decay, that his kingdom was everlasting, followed by Jesus’ appeal to the sign of Jonah when speaking on several occasions about how he would fulfill the predictions just mentioned.

Those Jews and the Romans who opposed Jesus’ messianic claims certainly were not regenerate (at least not yet for some of them), but they understood full well what Jesus’ resurrection meant, even if they never came to faith in Jesus and even if they denied that the resurrection ever happened. Granted, the Jews and Romans had vastly different presuppositions and interpretations of the resurrected Jesus than did Jesus’ followers post-resurrection. But the resurrection still stands as the supreme fact of Christianity. Rejection of Jesus’ resurrection as confirmation of his claims does not mean his resurrection never occurred. There was still an empty tomb, and Jesus continued to appear to his followers. The rejection of Jesus by unbelievers stemmed from sinful and willful prejudice (whether self-conscious or not)–what Paul describes as the suppression of truth in unrighteousness (Romans 1:18).

In this instance, we see the critical difference between Reid and Kant and how their differing understanding of perception impacts how we interpret “facts.” How do we perceive the world around us? Directly and spontaneously? Or is our perception of the world ultimately determined by oura priori心理范畴?甚至通过我们罪恶的假设?里德、康德和范泰尔对这些令人烦恼的问题给出了截然不同的答案。

The Decline of SCSR

尽管里德生前比休谟更具影响力,但在这场讨论中潜藏的一个问题是,如果常识是不言而喻的,为什么里德和斯大林会如此迅速地陷入相对的默默无闻之中?很明显的原因是里德Inquirywas completely overshadowed soon after its publication by Immanuel Kant’s ground-breaking纯粹理性批判(1781). Reid’s philosophy of common sense (along with the Scottish school associated with him), was openly maligned by Kant, who did not read English. Kant curtly labeled “common sense philosophy” as mere opinion. It did not help that the notoriously poor translation of Reid’s work Kant had read erroneously translated “common sense” as “public rumor” (Robinson,自然怎么可能,第120页,第6页)。

康德驳斥了任何试图建立一个严格的系统哲学的企图,这种哲学是建立在未经学习的大众的观点的基础上的,他们利用诸如公共谣言之类的粗俗的东西(即公共舆论)。康德指出,常识与Popularphilosophie, as it was then known and taught in Germany. Kant, who claimed to be troubled by his personal mania for systematizing, expressed open disdain for the popular philosophy then in vogue. Kant was a vocal champion of the so-calledSchulphilosophie(the philosophy of the schools–i.e., that of professional philosophers). Kant complained that a philosophy like SCSR could be used by any “wind-bag” to confound even the most sophisticated philosopher–a point which actually works in Reid’s favor! Kant’s criticism of SCSR boils down to the fact that common sense is not sophisticated, too simplistic, and amounts to nothing but a “herd mentality.” This is a charge which has been repeated often by critics of SCSR since the days of Reid. No doubt, such a back-handed dismissal by someone as influential as Kant pushed Reid and SCSR deep into philosophical backwater.

但随着最近的康德奖学金已经令人信服地shown (i.e., Manfred Kuehn, Karl Ameriks, Daniel Robinson), Kant’s negative assessment of SCSR widely misses the mark. Several of Kant’s proposals were actually quite similar to those previously advocated by Reid. Many of Kant’s German contemporaries were greatly influenced by the Scottish philosophy and Reid in particular. When pressed to explain how it was that thea prioricategories of his “transcendental idealism” were necessary to explain human sense perception, Kant defaulted to “Mutterwitz,” i.e., to “mother nature” (Kant,Critique, A133-5/B172-4)–a notion virtually identical to that of Reid, who spoke of his first principles as coming from the “mint of nature,” i.e., from God who made us with such capacities At the end of the day, Kant, quite ironically, ends up where Reid begins–we must utilizea priori类别,因为我们是这种方式。但康德没有解释“母亲机智”,而Reid则。

Reid学者已经编目了雷德尔死亡后SCSR的影响减少的其他原因。这些包括Reid的哲学在突出两代的重要英国哲学家遭遇攻击之下,John Stuart Mill(1806-1873)。磨坊是功利主义的主要支持者,这召开了道德哲学必须适当考虑个人和社会的“更大的”,因为重新坚持的是道德的第一个原则,因此不能以道德第一原则为基础。磨坊抱怨雷德对直觉的诉求只是促进自身利益的另一种方式,而不是共同的好处。

Yet, another reason suggested for SCSR’s decline is that the compiler of Reid’sWorks威廉汉密尔顿爵士(Sir William Hamilton),汉密尔顿(ham)费尽周折地试图将自己的康德式亲和力与里德的SCSR结合起来,事实上汉密尔顿与里德的SCSR的能干代言人相去甚远。最后,一些人注意到苏格兰启蒙运动已经走上了正轨,特别是当苏格兰大学开始聘请更倾向于功利主义的非赖德教授,或者康德和黑格尔的大陆哲学。沃尔特斯多夫认为,这在一定程度上是由于黑格尔在现代哲学发展上的烙印的兴起,使得里德在大陆理性主义者、英国经验主义者(沃尔特斯多夫捍卫里德两者都不是的概念)和康德黑格尔综合论(沃尔特斯多夫,托马斯•里德and the Story of Epistemology, X)。

No doubt, the chief reason for the decline of Reid’s prior wide influence was the triumph of Kant’s “transcendental idealism” over Reid’s “common sense.”

Reid’s On-Going Influence and Resurgence


Reid and SCSR may have been relegated to the philosophical backwater by Kant’sCritique,但里德的影响没有完全消退,especially in America, where Reid was widely read and greatly appreciated. Thomas Jefferson was glowing in his praise for Dugald Stewart, the Scottish philosopher who did much to popularize Reid and SCSR throughout the English-speaking world. Several early United States Supreme Court cases make appeal to the “eminent Dr. Reid” when wrestling with the nature of facts and their interpretation. Scottish-American philosopher and president of Princeton College, James McCosh (1811-1894) and Yale professor and president Noah Porter (1811-1892) maintained strong interest in Reid and SCSR since both were concerned about the “objectivity of truth,” especially in matters of moral philosophy.

由于康德和黑格尔的哲学体系从未成为美国的主流(约西亚·罗伊斯(Josiah Royce)等几个著名的例外),因此,美国唯一的哲学流派实用主义最终取代了里德的SCSR。美国实用主义之父查尔斯·桑德斯·皮尔斯(Charles Sanders Pierce,1839-1914)在某种程度上同意里德的观点,并认为普遍常识(如里德所表达的)值得作为哲学范畴加以恢复,尽管皮尔斯认为常识应该与实验验证和进化论意义上的科学方法联系在一起展现真理,而不是建立在首要原则的基础上。

皮尔斯后,新兴实用主义者能听懂ood that outcomes in philosophy and the sciences were directly tied to verifiable consequences, most notably experiential “cash value.” William James (1842-1910), perhaps America’s most notable pragmatist, gave a well-received lecture on “Pragmatism and Common Sense” (James,公关agmatism, 63 - 75)。詹姆斯认为常识是同情tible with pragmatism because James believed that without any prior self-reflection on such matters people naturally tended to gravitate toward ideas and systems of thought which produced concrete results. Since pragmatism is grounded in outcomes, there was little interest in anything like Reid’s first principles among the pragmatists. Pragmatism may make appeal to “common sense,” but such an appeal is actually a negation of common sense as understood by Reid. Yet, it was an easy intellectual move for Americans to give up SCSR for pragmatism, the nouveau cutting edge philosophy of the day.

Reid’s common sense was popularized on the Continent by French philosopher Victor Cousin (1792-1867) and was begrudgingly praised by Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), a moral philosopher in the utilitarian tradition and the Knightbridge Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge. G. E. Moore (1873-1958) one of the founders of the analytic tradition, cites Reid throughout his works. Reid’s work also had a significant influence upon American philosopher Roderick Chisholm (1916-1999) who trained a number of leading American philosophers, and who acknowledged that his own defense of common sense was indebted to Reid. More than one philosopher (i.e., Lehrer, Wolterstorff) has noted that in Ludwig Wittgenstein’sOn Certainty,维特根斯坦正在以一种与里德的“常识”惊人地相似的方式来阐述他所说的“我们共同的世界图景”,但没有诉诸于我们的本性(第一原则)。

Perhaps those who have done the most to rescue Reid from the irrelevance of the philosophical backwater, are the so-called “Reformed Epistemologists,” Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff. Along with philosopher William Alston, they done much to rekindle current interest in Reid and SCSR, especially within the broader Reformed tradition. Reformed epistemologists contend that belief in God is “properly basic.” That is, it is rational to believe in God without any evidence or proof for doing so. According to Plantinga, religious belief is grounded in what John Calvin identified as an innate human awareness of God’s existence (the so-calledsensus divinitatis).


Looking for philosophical antecedents, Reformed Epistemologists make appeal to Reid’s notion that beliefs arise in us spontaneously because we are born with them. These basic beliefs function like “common sense”–people believe in God without any prior reflection–but such simple belief can be further cultivated through instruction and maturation through the experiences of life. We may not be able to give a reason for God’s existence, and any reasons we might offer to prove God’s existence, presuppose the very capability of reasoning with which we have been created by God. For the Reformed Epistemologist, belief in God as properly basic functions as a first principle. Such belief is rational (and therefore “warranted”) every bit as much as are our belief in the existence of other minds, or our memory of past events.

Reformed Critics of Reid


当我在教授辩护学的过程中提到托马斯·里德,或者在谈到《科学与社会责任研究报告》对老普林斯顿大学(以及在那里教书的主要神学家查尔斯·霍奇和B.B.沃菲尔德)的哲学影响时,许多人承认他们从未听说过里德,或者对他了解很少。考虑到里德不幸的默默无闻,这并不奇怪。保守派和忏悔派改革派的其他人对里德有相当负面的印象,他们把里德的哲学描述为“理性主义”或托马斯主义的一种。这些回应表明,该党对里德的哲学不是很熟悉,没有读过里德的书,也没有正确理解里德——考虑到里德经常受到的坏消息,这并不奇怪。里德,正如我们所看到的,不是一个理性主义者,而是。随着最近在改革认识论者中重新发现里德,托马斯主义的罗马天主教捍卫者试图与里德的认识论保持距离,认为他的“常识”表述与圣托马斯的基础主义不相容Thomstic Papers IV., ed., Kennedy, 200).

Much of this criticism of Reid and SCSR comes from the camp of the followers of Cornelius Van Til, who contend that Reid’s philosophy lay behind B. B. Warfield’s unwitting compromise of the defense of the faith through Old Princeton’s advocacy of an apologetic method naively grounded in Christian evidences. Van Tilians are quite correct right to connect Warfield to Reid and SCSR (with certain modifications in the direction of Reformed orthodoxy made by Warfield). Yet, they regard Warfield’s approach as necessarily entailing an appeal to “right reason” which, to their minds, is an impossibility in light of the damage done to humanity (and to oura priori类别和解释能力)。不可再生的人不能“正确地”利用理性。沃菲尔德,被认为对不相信的想法让步太多,这是一个自我挫败的举动。

为了证明范泰尔呼吁纠正老普林斯顿的道歉是必要的,范泰利主义者经常拥护批判性的学术共识(欧内斯特·桑登、杰克·罗杰斯、唐纳德·麦基姆和约翰·C·范德斯泰尔特),他们的结论是,沃菲尔德是某种理性主义者,他背离了加尔文的圣经主义,甚至与《圣经》相呼应沃菲尔德对“正确理性”的认可等同于人类理性对神性启示的含蓄提升,这是一个缺乏根据的批判观察。

But Warfield’s comments about right reason fully comport with the way in which the Reformed orthodox of prior generations (i.e., Turretin) spoke of an “ministerial use” of reason which was necessary to interpret the revelation which God gives, while at the same time rejecting a “magisterial” use of reason which determines the content of revelation (Muller,后改革教条主义,第1卷:神学序言, 243). Warfield’s appeal to right reason amounts to nothing more than the proper utilization of those rational powers given us from birth by our Creator. To use “right reason” rightly, we must operate within an epistemological framework like that set out by Reid. Christians can make appeal to those evidences given by God through divine revelation, i.e., our Lord’s resurrection and self-attestation to be the very Son of God, because the Apostles did. The Christian evidences marshaled by Warfield for Christ’s resurrection have their origin in God’s revelation, not in human reason.

Reid, Old Princeton, and Warfield are also sharply criticized by American church historians Mark Noll and George Marsden, who both follow the critical and Van Tilian party lines in assuming that Reid’s SCSR has rationalist tendencies which, they contend, are incompatible with Reformed orthodoxy (Riddlebarger,普林斯顿之狮, 247-253). Marsden contends that SCSR was simply not up to the challenge raised by Darwinians regarding what it was exactly that was entailed by primitive common sense beliefs (Marsden, “The Collapse of American Evangelical Academia,” in Plantinga and Wolterstorff, eds.,信仰与理性:理性与对上帝的信仰, 244). 因为查尔斯·霍奇和B.B.沃菲尔德没有意识到这一点,马斯登和诺尔总结说,老普林斯顿的道歉是严重的,如果无意中,他们未能更密切地跟踪加尔文和他的真正的神学继承人,亚伯拉罕库珀和赫尔曼巴文克-这两个B.B.沃菲尔德高度重视,但公开批评完全放弃道歉。

Recovering Reid’s Common Sense Epistemology–the Implications for Doing Apologetics


I hope that the points which follow will serve to place Reid, and by implication, Old Princeton, in a more objective and favorable light, and as a consequence, help Reformed Christians recover confidence in the proper use of Christian evidences when engaging in the apologetic enterprise.

第一,里德是一位基督教哲学家,他关于外部世界的真理和普通事实的重要性的必要和偶然的首要原则和常识观念具有深刻的神学含义。里德的基督教承诺非常值得一提。在他的作品中,里德始终呼吁上帝作为人性的作者,没有上帝,外部世界和人性就不会存在。在本体论上,我们必须假定上帝的存在是万物的基础。在认识论上,我们必须从我们自己开始,假定外部世界的确定性,并在意识到我们是具有能动力量的生物的情况下运作。里德说的对,我认为,他认为这就是普通人的日常生活方式。

Reid的常识认识学,有效的超越论证的基础。当非基督徒反对基督徒真相索赔时,他们必须援引Reid的常识第一个原则(或类似于他们的类别)来争论基督教。在非基督徒的预设中,甚至可能是如何 - 尤其是唯物主义的东西?逻辑如何在没有创造者或设计师的机会宇宙中工作?

Several additional points are worth making. Plantinga frames Reid’s first principles in terms of belief in God as “properly basic.” If we can believe that other minds exist without any reasons whatsoever–a belief we cannot prove–on what basis then is belief in God declared irrational? Plantinga uses this “unprovable starting point” to argue against “foundationalism” (i.e., the notion that we must have sufficient evidence which “proves” the validity of our starting point). But is not Reid’s "soft" foundationalism much better? When we seek to get behind our common sense first principles, we immediately encounter the God who made us capable of using them.

我也认为Reid的第一原理的教义有助于清除普遍疲软的主要弱点van til的Presupopositiv。范蒂尔的道歉是建立在知道(认识论)和(本体论)的顺序的混合时建立的。当他坚持不安时,我完全同意van til,如果没有创造所有东西并使我们作为他的形象承载者,我们就可以妥善了解。然而,范直到坚持认为,真正的基督徒的认识论始于上帝的自我启示(经文)上帝的ectypal知识。

But this raises two seemingly insurmountable problems. The first is that it is psychologically impossible to begin the knowing process outside of ourselves, apart from any prior self-consciousness. Only God can start the knowing process with himself in this sense. As his creature, and despite Van Tilian protests to the contrary, I simply cannot start where Van Tilians insist that I must (with the revelation of God). As a creature who receives this revelation externally, I can only begin with self-awareness, knowledge of the world around me, and of my own agentic powers. Unless the knowledge of God which Van Til insists upon is innate and hard-wired within me, and is available and clear to me from the first moments of my self-consciousness, I need all such external revelation confirmed as revelation coming from God. Descartes’ ugly question resurfaces at this point. “How do I know this revelation is from God and not from the devil?” My own doubts will emerge as well. “How do I know this knowledge is from God and not the product of my own vain imagination?” Completing religious claims also surface. “Why the Bible and not the Book of Mormon or the Koran?”

At this point, it is helpful to distinguish general from special revelation. Paul speaks of God’s revelation in nature as plain to all (Romans 1:19-20) as well as God’s law as written upon the human heart (Romans 2:14-15). This is general revelation. Furthermore, we bear the divine image and retain the sense of divinity. But does such knowledge of God given through the natural order include knowledge of the Trinity, the person of Jesus and his redemptive work on my behalf? No. The nature of God and his saving work in Christ is revealed to me externally in God’s word, which is the record of his redemptive words and deeds (special revelation). As B. B. Warfield once put it when addressing this very issue, “it is easy, of course, to say that a Christian man must take his stand point not above the Scriptures, but in the Scriptures. He very certainly must. But surely he must first have the Scriptures, authenticated to him as such, before he can take his standpoint in them” (Warfield, “Introductory Note,” to Francis Beattie’sApologetics注:在沃菲尔德对巴文克的评论中,同样的说法几乎一字不差德泽克海德斯格罗夫斯,” 115).

As Van Til made plain his allegiance in this regard, declaring “I have chosen the position of Abraham Kuyper” (Van Til,The Defense of the Faith, 264-265), so too, I must declare that I have chosen the position of B. B. Warfield.

Reid does not ask us to begin with a theory of ideas ora prioricategories (as with Kant), or even by presupposing the entire system of Christian doctrine (Kuyper, Bavinck, and Van Til).Instead, Reid asks us to start with an epistemological method, or better, with a particular kind of awareness of the external world and how it works common to all. When John Frame raises the presuppositionalist challenge that “`starting with the self’ leaves open the question of what criterion of truth the self should acknowledge, so `starting with reason’ leaves open the question of what criterion of truth human reason ought to recognize” (Frame, “Van Til and the Ligonier Apologetic,” inThe Westminster Theological Journal, Volume XLVII, Fall 1985, number 2, 285-287), Reid would likely answer, we utilize “those criteria [first principles] we are born with, given us by our Creator.” These criteria are not a matter of a choice ofa priori解释范畴,而是一种呼吁,去认识那些我们天生就具备的、我们自发地利用的理性能力。

Embracing Reid’s common sense first principles allows us to begin the knowing process with human consciousness, while at the same time asserting that such would not be possible apart from a creator. This is, I think, a healthy corrective to Van Til’s presuppositionalism.

第二, although there are several areas in Reid’s thought which orthodox Reformed Christians might find problematic–especially Reid’s endorsement of natural theology, along with the telling absence of any discussion of the effects of Adam's fall upon human nature–we do not need to follow Reid in every area of his thought to appreciate and draw upon his insights regarding first principles and the related common sense tests for truth. As Paul Helm points out, there is nothing intrinsic to Reid’s common sense philosophy which is antithetical to Reformed doctrine (Helm, “Thomas Reid, Common Sense and Calvinism,” in Hart, Van Der Hoeven, and Wolterstorff, eds.理性的Calvinian传统, 86-88). Whatever theological weaknesses may exist in Reid’s overall philosophy can be mitigated by considering how the Old Princetonians (especially Warfield) were able to utilize SCSR as modified in light of the Reformed doctrine of the noetic effects of sin, and the necessity of regeneration as prior to faith.

Warfield was, to my mind, on the right track when he argued that the certitude of the truth of Christianity “is at bottom nothing other than the conviction that God is in Christ reconciling the world with himself . . . . It is only by the direct act of faith laying hold of Jesus as redeemer that we may attain either conviction of the truth of the Christian religion or the assurance of salvation.” Such a faith is not a blind or ungrounded epistemological leap into the dark. “For ourselves,” Warfield writes, “we confess we can conceive of no act of faith in any kind which is not grounded in evidence: faith is a specific form or persuasion or conviction, and all persuasion or conviction is grounded in evidence” (Warfield’s “Review” of Bavinck’s德泽克海德斯格罗夫斯,” 112-113).

We can hear the loud echo from Thomas Reid in Warfield’s conception that faith requires sufficient grounds in evidence. But this echo also requires additional biblical qualification. The reason why people do not believe the gospel is not that there are insufficient reasons given by God to provide grounds for faith. God gives evidences which meet the needs of our “common sense” tests for truth–Jesus was raised from the dead, or he wasn’t. This claim is intelligible to Christian and non-Christian alike.

The reason why people reject a gospel with sufficient grounds to believe it is because of human sin–a point not directly addressed by Reid. The biblical record is crystal clear that all the members of Adam’s race inevitably suppress God’s truth in unrighteousness (to use Paul’s language). Like Reid, Warfield believed that all humans possess the innate capacity to believe the gospel because the evidence demonstrates that Christianity is objectively true. But Warfield also understood full-well the damage wrought upon us by the Fall. Warfield speaks to this directly when he describes the pre-fall consciousness of humanity as reflecting a “glad and loving trust” in the Creator. After Adam’s fall, human consciousness was distorted to the point that it now reflects a profound sense of distrust, unbelief, fear, and despair in relation to the Creator. As a consequence, we sinful humans no longer possess the subjective ability to respond to Christian truth claims in faith (116).

The problem is not a lack of evidence for the truth of Christianity, but rather a universal and sinful unwillingness to believe that the facts of God’s revelation which are in themselves worthy of our trust. It is the Holy Spirit’s supernatural work to give the sinful human heart a new power to respond to the grounds of faith given by God (i.e., Christian evidences), which are sufficient to persuade anyone and already present in the mind (115).

The subjective certainty of faith of which Scripture repeatedly speaks therefore must be supplied by the Holy Spirit in the hearts of the elect, through the preaching of the gospel, a message grounded in the God-given evidences for the truth of Christianity. The Holy Spirit creates this subjective ability not through additional evidences for the truth of Christianity (as though the evidences God has given are insufficient), but through a supernatural act of new birth. People who are dead in sin will not believe until made alive. Yet as Warfield reminds us, “the Holy Spirit does not produce faith without grounds” (115). Those grounds include those Christian evidences associated with the preaching of the gospel.

第三,里德对真理的“常识”测试非常符合圣经作者在使徒行传14:15-17中所说的,当他们使用偶然性和因果关系(上帝创造了世界)的论据时所提出的那种真理主张。里德强调事实的客观性(基于我们对外部世界的直接感知),这似乎与保罗呼吁耶稣复活以确认他向雅典人所传的真理福音是一致的(使徒行传17:31)。圣经的作者从不试图证明上帝的存在,尽管他们确实指出上帝是万物的最终原因,也是人性的作者(用里德的话)。保罗毫不避讳地告诉聚集在火星山上的雅典人,他们自己的一位诗人曾说过:“我们在他里面生活,活动,有我们的存在”(使徒行传17:28)。

保罗,和其他圣经作者that matter, asks his audience to “assume Christian presuppositions for the sake of argument,” so that they can understand the content of what is being proclaimed. Paul’s appeal is to a God whom his audiences already know and to a knowledge they presently possess but which is sinfully suppressed. When Paul proclaims that the resurrection (as an historical event) is the proof that his preaching about Jesus is true, Paul need not explain what he means, nor defend the possibility of miracles. It is a very “common sense” kind of claim to preach that Jesus was crucified on a Friday and raised bodily from the dead three days later. Everyone who heard Paul preach–without prior critical reflection or philosophical sophistication–grasps the significance of that claim.

似乎不可能,如果耶稣是从死里复活的,那么保罗和他的福音就被证明是正确的。他的信息是值得相信和接受的。他的主张只有在自觉带有偏见的情况下才能被驳回或驳回。人们不喜欢保罗讲道的含意,正是因为他们理解保罗真理主张的包罗万象的本质。那时,人们和现在一样,不愿意承认自己在上帝面前有罪,迫切需要救世主。他们可能会拒绝保罗的福音,但耶稣的坟墓仍然是空的。上帝所给的“证据”仍然像谚语中的“达摩克利斯之剑”一样站在他们的面前。只有这一事实才能证明保罗所说的真理,并将那些拒绝的人定罪,直到他们死去,或者他们设法把它从他们的良心中推开,或者直到他们接受它。

Finally, Reid’s notion that common sense is universal gives us an important way to establish non-neutral common ground with non-Christians. Instead of the “us” (regenerate) against “them” (unregenerate)a priori类别,里德从普遍的共同点开始-外部世界和其中发生的一切。但非基督徒必须生活在一个呼喊着它是上帝创造的世界里,而我们作为被造物只能在这个世界上航行,因为上帝就是这样创造我们的。有共同点(正如保罗能够找到犹太人和希腊人),但没有中立(也可以看到保罗的直接挑战希腊异教徒)。这为有效的道歉辩论开辟了广阔的领域。

结论:

虽然长期忽略了,但托马斯里德的常识哲学提供了一种直接在人性中建立非中性共同的方式。这在一个假设的自我认证宗教真相索赔中非常重要。Reid的超越论据是特别有用的,因为他们强迫非基督徒辩护他们对基督教的论点。来自在哪里对抗基督教的论点来了,以及如何合理?非基督徒挣扎回答这些问题。Reid为我们提供了一种乐于乐于助人和实用的方式来利用这种弱点。

Reid’s notion of truth as objective and immediate (i.e., apart froma prioricategories and ideal theories) clearly echoes the approach taken by the Apostle Paul and provides an epistemological footing for the chief argument in defense of Christianity, Jesus’ resurrection from the dead. For those who wish to integrate apologetic arguments into evangelistic contexts, Reid offers a suitable (and non-philosophical) epistemological justification for Christian truth claims. Should someone predict their own resurrection and then rise again (Jesus), the only conclusion is that proclaimed by Paul; God has given us proof, proof which is grounded in the facts of revelation (Acts 17:31). The declaration "He is risen!" requires nothing but "common sense" to fully understand. But only the Holy Spirit can enable those who understand to truly believe.

May the Reid resurgence continue!

阅读里德:

The two volumes of Reid’s collectedWorks(the Hamilton edition) are available as free downloads (in PDF). Reid’s three main works,An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, (1864)关于人的知识权力的论文(1785), andEssays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind(1788) are included in Reid’s works, but are also widely available as separate volumes. These three volumes are offered together on Kindle for a very reasonable price

If you wish to merely sample Reid, I would recommend the paperback volume edited by Ronald Beanblossom and Keith Lehrer,托马斯•里德: Inquiry and Essays,在哈克特经典系列.This volume is still in print, if you want to purchase a new edition. But there are plenty of used copies readily available on-line–cheap. The introductory essay is worth the price of the book.

强烈推荐Ryan Nichols和Gideon Yaffe在斯坦福哲学百科全书上发表的关于里德的在线文章:https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reid/

同时强烈推荐的还有丹尼尔·罗宾逊教授的牛津大学里德和休谟讲座,https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/reids-critique-hume..These lectures awakened me from my dogmatic slumbers a while back. I’ve been reading Reid every since!


关于里德的书:

Cuneo and Van Woudenberg’s剑桥伴侣托马斯里德, contains a number of useful essays on Reid’s work including essays on common sense, perception, and religion.

亚历山大弗雷泽托马斯•里德,在Forgotten Books Series is dated, but provides a good introduction to Reid’s life and career.

Keith Lehrer’s托马斯•里德, is highly recommended–although out of print and hard to find. This is, in my opinion, the best introduction to Reid’s thought.

Dugald Stewart’s “Life of Thomas Reid,” is found in volume one of托马斯·里德的作品,并通过他的首席弟子提供Reid的生命和工作的早期治疗。

Nicholas Wolterstorff’s托马斯•里德and the Story of Epistemology是一本有趣的书,集中在里德的效用改革认识论。


关于苏格兰常识哲学(SCSR)的书籍

S. A. Grave’s,苏格兰的常识哲学仍然是苏格兰学校的最佳批量处理。你必须去图书馆找副本

James McCosh’sThe Scottish Philosophy, is a useful history of the individual figures in the Scottish School. You can find this as a PDF download.

Daniel Sommer Robinson’sThe Story of Scottish Philosophy: A Compendium of Selections from the Writings of Nine Preeminent Scottish Philosophers, with Biobibliographical Essays, is an anthology of Reid and others. Includes Reid’s correspondence with Hume.